R v Watson (Clarence) (2024)

[1989] EWCA Crim J0526-4

Before:

The Lord Chief Justice of England (Lord Lane)

Mr. Justice Faquharson

and

Mr. Justice Potts

No. 1609/B3/88

Regina

and

Clarence Archibald Watson

MR. M. WEST, Q.C. and MR. D. RADFORD appeared on behalf of the Appellant.

MR. R. AMLOT, Q.C. and MR. N. SWEENEY appeared on behalf of the Crown.

1

On 24th February 1988 in the Central Criminal Court, this appellant was convicted of manslaughter. He had already pleaded guilty to burglary. He was sentenced on the following day as follows: in respect of the manslaughter, four years' imprisonment; in respect of the burglary, two years' imprisonment to run concurrently. He was also in breach of two suspended sentences of three months' and six months' imprisonment respectively, which were ordered to take effect unaltered and consecutively to the other sentences. The total sentence was therefore one of four years and nine months imprisonment.

2

He now appeals against conviction by leave of the single Judge.

3

The facts of the case, in so far as they are relevant, were as follows. Late at night on 11th December 1986 two men, one of whom was the appellant, broke into the home of a man called Harold Moyler. Mr. Moyler was 87 years old and suffered from a serious condition of the heart. He lived alone. The two men first threw a brick through the window and, having made entry to the house, confronted Mr. Moyler as he woke up, abused him verbally and then made off without stealing anything.

4

Mr. Moyler died an hour and a half later as the result of a heart attack. The case for the Crown was that the heart attack was a direct consequence of the unlawful actions of the appellant and his colleague.

5

The defence put forward by the appellant was that he was not responsible for the death. Mr. Moyler's heart condition could have caused his death at any time, quite apart from any question of excitement or shock. Furthermore, there were two events subsequent to the burglary, either of which might have precipitated the heart attack: first, the arrival of the police, and secondly, the arrival of council workmen to board-up the broken window. Any adverse effect of the burglary, it was suggested, would have ceased long before the death occurred.

6

There was a sharp conflict of evidence on the medical issue. Dr. West, who was called on behalf of the prosecution, had performed the autopsy. He was sure that the burglary was the cause of death. He described for the benefit of the jury how excitement causes the production of adrenalin making the heart beat faster. The heart therefore needs more blood and oxygen, but is unable to obtain it if there is a chronic heart disease, as there was here, with the result that the arteries leading to the heart are substantially narrowed. The heart then begins to beat irregularly, it eventually stops beating and thus death ensues.

7

He said that his opinion was that this chain of events began with the burglary and continued up to the time of death. The initial shock caused by the burglary could last for a considerable period of time, and certainly for the one and a half hours which was the length of time involved in the present case.

8

At the close of the prosecution case counsel for the appellant submitted, unsuccessfully, that there was no case for the appellant to answer.

9

The appellant himself did not give evidence, but on his behalf Dr. Matterson was called to give evidence. His opinion was that the excitement and stress caused by the burglary could not have been a subsisting and operating cause of death one and a half hours later. If any extraneous incident was responsible for the heart attack, it must have been the arrival of the police or that of the council workmen. However the victim's condition was such that a heart attack could have occurred at any time without the necessity of any excitement or shock.

10

It is accepted that the learned Judge correctly defined the offence of manslaughter as it applied to the circ*mstances as follows: "Manslaughter is the offence committed when one person causes the death of another by an act which is unlawful and which is also dangerous, dangerous in the sense that it is an act which all sober and reasonable people would inevitably realise must subject the victim to the risk of some harm resulting whether the defendant realised that or not."

11

The first point taken on behalf of the appellant is this. When one is deciding whether the sober and reasonable person (the bystander) would realise the risk of some harm resulting to the victim, how much knowledge of the circ*mstances does one attribute to the bystander? The appellant contends that the unlawful act here was the burglary as charged in the indictment.

12

The charge was laid under section 9(1)(a) of the Theft Act 1968, the allegation being that the appellant had entered the building as a trespasser with intent to commit theft. Since that offence is committed at the first moment of entry, the bystander's knowledge is confined to that of the defendant at that moment. In the instant case there was no evidence that the appellant, at the moment of entry, knew the age or physical condition of Mr. Moyler or even that he lived there alone.

13

The Judge clearly took the view that the jury were entitled to ascribe to the bystander the knowledge which the appellant gained during the whole of his stay in the house and so directed them. Was this a misdirection? In our judgment it was not. The unlawful act in the present circ*mstances comprised the whole of the burglarious intrusion and did not come to an end upon the appellant's foot crossing the threshold or windowsill. That being so, the appellant (and therefore the bystander) during the course of the unlawful act must have become aware of Mr. Moyler's frailty and approximate age, and the Judge's directions were accordingly correct. We are supported in this view by the fact that no one at the trial seems to hzve thought othewise.

14

The second ground of appeal arises in the following way. The prosecution, as already indicated, based their case upon the proposition advanced by Dr. West that the burglary had caused the heart attack to occur one and a half hours later. The Judge had correctly directed the jury on these lines, setting out Dr. West's opinion and the conflicting opinion of Dr. Matterson, to the effect that the stress caused by the burglary would have subsided in 20 minutes and that the fatal heart attack was therefore either spontaneous or the result of the arrival of the police or the council workmen.

15

Finally on this point, the Judge said this: "So, what do you do? You must consider all these opinions very carefully, you must say to yourselves, where you have someone as skilled and experienced as Dr. Matterson expressing the views as he did, it might be very difficult for you to reject his opinion out of hand. If you do say to yourselves: 'Well, Dr. Matterson is right', or 'He may be right', that is all you need to say to yourself. If he may be right it would be proper for you to return a verdict of not guilty in this case."

16

That, like the rest of his directions to the jury prior to their retirement, was simple, concise and clear.

17

However after the jury had been in retirement for some time, they returned with two questions. The second of the two questions was not easy to understand, but the effect was to ask what should be the verdict if the victim's heart beat had returned to normal after the burglary but the arrival either of the police or of the council workmen had caused a second crisis which resulted in death "as a direct result of the emotional stress which was continuing in the victim".

18

A discussion took place in the absence of the jury as to how the Judge should deal with this difficult matter. The Judge was clearly minded at first to direct the jury to acquit if that was the conclusion at which they had arrived.

19

Mr. Amlot however, for the prosecution, by a submissiion, which he tells us he...